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Abstract 
 
Our paper examines the distress anomaly on the Chinese stock markets. We show that the 
anomaly disappears after controlling for institutional ownership. We propose two hypotheses. 
The growing scale of institutional investors and changes in institutional preferences can 
generate greater demand shocks for stocks with low distress risk than those with high distress 
risk, causing the former to outperform the latter. Consistent with our hypotheses, the growth 
of institutions explains the anomaly when the institutional market share increases rapidly. We 
also show that institutional preferences for stocks with low distress risk have significantly 
increased over time and changes in preferences also explain the anomaly. Finally, momentum 
trading and gradual incorporation of distress information cannot account for the anomaly.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial distress means the probability that firms fail to fulfill their financial obligations. If 
financial distress represents undiversifiable risk, investors should command high expected 
returns for bearing distress risk (e.g. Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1996). The 
distress anomaly arises as distressed (i.e. high distress risk) stocks have lower future returns 
than safe (i.e. low distress risk) stocks (e.g. Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; 
Campbell et al., 2008). If individual investors like stocks with lottery-like payoffs that 
distressed stocks have, individual investors’ preferences could give rise to the price of 
distressed stocks, resulting in low future returns (e.g. Markowitz, 1952; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992; Kumar, 2009; Barberis and Huang, 2008).
1
 However, Conrad et al., (2014) 
find that preferences for lottery-like stocks cannot fully explain away the distress anomaly on 
the U.S. markets. Instead, Campbell et al., (2008) propose that when institutions generally 
prefer safe stocks and tend to purchase more safe stocks than distressed stocks in the 
institutional growth process, safe stocks will have higher valuations than distressed stocks. 
This paper investigates the conjecture of Campbell et al. (2008) whether institutional 
investors play a role in explaining the distress anomaly in the Chinese stock markets. 
Institutions are fiduciaries to make investment decisions on behalf of other investors. 
Institutional investments are constrained by regulations (e.g. Prudent Man rules in the U.S. 
and the Institutional Fund Regulations in China
2
) aimed at preventing institutions from 
speculating other investors’ money in highly risky stocks (e.g. Badrinath et al., 1996; Del 
Guercio, 1996). Large, liquid and fundamentally strong stocks are, therefore, attractive to 
institutions (e.g. Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Griffin et al., 2003; 
Kumar, 2009; Choi and Sias, 2012). These institutionally preferred characteristics are shown 
to have negative correlations with the probability of default (e.g. Falkenstein, 1996; Campbell 
et al., 2008), suggesting that institutions have a preference for low distress risk.  
Campbell et al., (2008) propose that the rising scale of institutional ownership on the market 
can raise the price (hence the contemporaneous returns) of institutionally preferred stocks. 
Specifically, institutions sell professionally managed funds to individual investors. When 
                                                          
1
 Chava and Purnandam (2010), George and Hwang (2010) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) argue that 
small-sample effects, the costs of financial distress and differences in shareholder recovery, respectively, cause 
the low returns for distressed stocks.  
2
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institutions attract more funds from individuals, the market share of institutions will grow. 
The growth of the institutional share causes the overall market demand to shift towards the 
stocks preferred by institutions, thereby raising these stocks’ prices. Consistent with the shift 
of the overall market demand, Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that growing institutional 
ownership associated with institutional preferences for large stocks in the U.S. forms demand 
shocks to increase returns for large stocks relative to small stocks, therefore eliminating the 
size premium. A similar institutional force can drive the distress anomaly. When institutions 
are growing fast, safe stocks that are preferred by institutions will have greater demand 
shocks than distressed stocks that are less preferred by institutions. These demand shocks 
could cause safe stocks to have higher contemporaneous returns than distressed stocks. We 
call this pricing mechanism the institutional growth hypothesis. In line with this 
institution-based explanation, Campbell et al., (2008) point out that the U.S. distress anomaly 
is concentrated in periods such as the late 1980s, when aggregate institutional ownership was 
growing rapidly.  
The institutional growth hypothesis is based upon institutional preferences for stocks with 
low distress risk (i.e. the negative correlation between distress risk and institutional 
ownership). However, prior studies show that institutions’ preferences may change over time. 
For instance, Bennett et al. (2003) find that institutional preferences in the U.S. have shifted 
from large stocks towards small stocks as institutions search for “greener pastures”. If safe 
stocks have better past performance than distressed stocks, relative performance-chasing will 
also lead institutional holdings to tilt more towards safe stocks (e.g. Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; 
Chen et al., 2000; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). In addition, when expected economic growth 
is negative, institutional investors may change their style investing by selling more distressed 
stocks than they do in normal times, representing an increasing aversion to distress risk (e.g. 
Shiller, 1984; 1989; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Froot and Teo, 2008). Changes in 
institutional preferences for safe stocks indicate that the negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and distress risk could exhibit different magnitudes over time.  
We propose that changes in institutional distress-based preferences can also be a potential 
force to cause the anomaly. Specifically, when institutions gradually develop an increase 
(decrease) in their preferences for low (high) distress risk over time, stocks with low (high) 
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distress risk would have positive (negative) demand shocks.
3
 Safe stocks will have an 
upward price pressure raised by institutions relative to distressed stocks, generating positive 
differences in contemporaneous returns between safe and distressed stocks. We call this 
explanation the preference-change hypothesis. This hypothesis indicates that changes in 
distress-based preferences can be translated into increasing institutional demand for safe 
stocks and/or decreasing the demand for distressed stocks and it also predicts that 
institutional ownership (i.e. the fraction held by all institutions) in safe stocks over distressed 
stocks will increase in the future. That is, the relationship between distress risk and 
institutional ownership will be changing over time. Consistent with this changing relationship, 
Conrad et al., (2014) find that the U.S. institutional ownership in high distressed stocks 
increases slower than that of the median stock over the period of the strong growth of 
institutional investors, implying that U.S. institutions may have developed an increasing 
aversion to distressed stocks and/or an increasing preference for safe stocks. In this study, we 
examine two new explanations for the distress anomaly, namely the preference-change 
hypothesis and the institutional growth hypothesis. The two hypotheses are different on the 
channel through which institutional demand shocks are generated: from the growing market 
share or from changes in distress-based preferences.  
The Chinese stock markets are an ideal case to study the role of institutions played in the 
distress anomaly. Firstly, Campbell et al., (2008) conjecture that the distress anomaly may be 
caused by the divergence between expected and realized returns for safe and distressed stocks 
due to specific events that occurred in the U.S.
4
 Thus, an empirical test for the presence of 
the anomaly outside the U.S. is much needed. Secondly, the Chinese stock markets have a 
weaker legal environment than the U.S. markets (e.g. Allen et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1997; 
2000). The lack of law enforcement can threaten shareholders’ claims on bankrupted firms’ 
residual assets, inducing institutions in China to have a stronger aversion to distress than 
those in the U.S.. Thirdly, the composition of market participants in China is different from 
that in the U.S.. Institutional investors hold more than 50% of total U.S. equity ownership, 
while institutional investors hold less than 30% of equity ownership in China (Benette et al., 
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 Demand shocks can also be caused by different institutions “herding” into the same stocks at the same time 
(e.g. Nofsinger and Sias, 1999). However, the demand shocks here are fundamentally different, as they are 
identified by changes in preferences of aggregate institutions over time rather than the cross-sectional bunching 
of these changes.     
4
 Chava and Purnanandam (2010) argue that the relationship between distress risk and expected returns is 
actually positive. However, the observed negative relationship between distress risk and realized returns is due 
to low realized returns on distressed stocks in the U.S. in the 1980s that were not anticipated by investors. 
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2003; Chen et al. 2007; Tang et al., 2012). Although the overall scale of institutional 
holdings in China is smaller than the U.S., the growth of the former is much faster than the 
latter. U.S. Institutional holdings increase from 28% to 51% during 1970 to 2004. In contrast, 
Chinese institutional holdings only take seven years (2000-2007) to grow from just over zero 
to more than 20%. The fast growth of institutional holdings is more likely to generate 
unexpected demand for the stocks that Chinese institutions prefer. Furthermore, institutions 
in China are younger and less experienced than U.S. peers in selecting stocks. When 
institutional investors improve their skills, their preferences for stock characteristics may 
incur changes over time. This contrasting backdrop raises the question whether institutions in 
emerging countries have similar preferences to those in developed markets. It is also 
interesting to know how the evolution of institutional preferences impacts stock prices.  
Based on distress events in China,
5
 we use dynamic panel logit models to estimate 
probabilities of distress as a proxy for distress risk. In our whole sample period from 2003 to 
2012, we find that the distress anomaly is present in the Chinese equity markets, suggesting 
that the distress anomaly is not exclusive to the U.S. markets. We also find that the distress 
anomaly disappears after double sorting distress risk against the contemporaneous level of 
institutional ownership. This important evidence leads us to analyze the role of institutions 
played in the anomaly. We first examine whether institutions exhibit the growth in scale or 
incur changes in preferences. Our results support both. The market share of institutions has 
dramatically increased from 2003 to 2007, supporting the growth of institutions. But, the 
institutional share has declined from 2008 to 2012. We also find that the level of distress risk 
is negatively related to institutional ownership, consistent with our prior that institutional 
investors indeed prefer stocks with low distress risk. More importantly, the results show that 
institutional preferences have incurred significant changes over the whole sample period. 
Although institutional investors generally prefer growth and large stocks, institutions have 
increased their holdings of small and value stocks over time. As investing in small and value 
stocks can also stimulate institutions’ intentions to reduce the exposure to distress risk, 
institutions increase their preferences for safe stocks (as well as liquid and less volatile 
stocks). Consistent with this, we find that distress risk can negatively predict future 
institutional demand, suggesting that institutions have gradually increased their holdings of 
safe stocks relative to distressed stocks over time. 
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 Section 2.2 provides more details.  
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Next, we decompose the level of institutional ownership into two components, namely lagged 
ownership to proxy for the demand shocks arising from growing institutional investors and 
changes in the ownership to proxy for the demand shocks generated by changes in 
preferences, in order to test which demand shocks are able to explain the distress anomaly. In 
portfolio analysis, the distress anomaly largely remains after controlling for lagged 
institutional ownership, while the anomaly has been completely eliminated after controlling 
for changes in institutional ownership in the whole sample period. Since institutions in China 
only experienced the strong growth over the period of 2003 to 2007, we further test the two 
hypotheses in two sub-periods (2003-2007 and 2008-2012). After controlling for lagged 
institutional ownership, the anomaly disappears in the earlier sub-period but remains in the 
later sub-period, consistent with the prediction of the institutional growth hypothesis. We also 
find that the outperformance of safe stocks over distress stocks becomes insignificant in both 
sub-periods after controlling for changes in institutional ownership, suggesting that the 
distress anomaly can be attributable to changes in institutional preferences. Our regression 
analysis renders very similar results to the portfolio analysis. In the whole sample period, 
changes in institutional ownership can subsume the predictive power of distress risk to 
returns, but lagged institutional ownership cannot. Furthermore, only in the earlier sub-period 
is lagged institutional ownership significantly positive and is able to subsume the predictive 
power of distress risk to returns. In contrast, changes in institutional ownership can subsume 
the negative relationship between distress risk and returns in both sub-periods. We also find 
that no distress anomaly is present in the stocks fully owned by individual investors. This 
finding is consistent with the U.S. evidence that individual investors and their preferences 
cannot completely explain away the distress anomaly (Conrad et al, 2014). Our further 
analysis shows that the magnitude of the distress anomaly is dependent on the degree of 
changes in distress-based preferences of institutions. The outperformance of safe stocks over 
distressed stocks is significantly positive only in quarters with a large increase in institutional 
preferences for stocks with low distress risk. In summary, our results suggest that changes in 
distress-based preferences and the growth of institutions are both responsible for the distress 
anomaly, while the former has a stronger impact on returns than the latter in our sample.  
Finally, we test two alternative interpretations of our results. Specifically, we test whether 
changes in institutional ownership can be explained by institutional momentum trading or by 
institutional gradual incorporation of distress information (e.g. Choi and Sias, 2012). Firstly, 
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we find that institutional investors do not increase their holdings of safe stocks relative to 
distressed stocks following the quarters in which safe stocks had the best performance. In 
contrast, an increase in the holding of safe stocks relative to distressed stocks occurs within 
the same quarters when safe stocks outperform the most. This provides less support for 
institutional momentum trading to explain the distress anomaly. Secondly, we find that the 
relationship between distress risk and institutional ownership is insignificantly different 
between the beginning and the end of each information period, inconsistent with the gradual 
incorporation of distress information. This evidence suggests that institutional investors have 
not significantly changed their holdings of safe and distressed stocks over the information 
period.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, previous studies have 
documented the distress anomaly in the U.S., while this study is the first one, to the best of 
our knowledge, to report the anomaly in one of important emerging markets. Second, 
previous research reveals that institutions prefer large, liquid and fundamentally strong stocks. 
We discover another important institutional preference: institutions prefer stocks with low 
distress risk. Moreover, our evidence is consistent with the style investing model in which 
institutional preferences for one style over another affect asset prices (Chan et al., 2002; 
Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). Third, our study provides new insights into the causes of the 
distress anomaly. Although Campbell et al., (2008) propose that institutional preferences may 
play an important role in the distress anomaly, the relevant empirical test is scarce. We 
hypothesize demand shocks generated through two channels to explain the distress anomaly, 
namely the growth of institutions and changes in institutional distress-based preferences. Our 
empirical results support the above institutional forces to drive the distress anomaly and 
validate the conjecture of Campbell et al., (2008). Despite of using sample stocks from an 
emerging market, our study has important implications for the distress anomaly in developed 
markets (e.g., the U.S.). Specifically, the disappearance of the size premium in the U.S. is due 
to demand shocks arising from growing institutions with their preferences for large stocks 
(Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The same institutional force is also likely to drive the distress 
anomaly if institutions have a preference for safe stocks. In addition, changes in institutional 
preferences in emerging markets, which are documented in this study, are very likely to occur 
in developed markets. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) model investment style to follow a 
specific life cycle, suggesting that styles based on distress risk can also change over time. 
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Bennett et al. (2003) discover that U.S. institutional investors shifted their investing 
preferences from large and growth stocks to small and value stocks from 1980s to 1990s. 
This changing pattern of institutional preferences may lead U.S. institutions to have a greater 
need to reduce distress risk if small and value stocks are perceived to be risky. Thus, 
institutional forces can change the price of safe and distressed stocks in developed markets as 
well as in our sample. Finally, in previous studies on the distress anomaly, a low level of 
institutional ownership is used as a proxy for high market frictions, which prevent the 
anomaly from being arbitraged away by sophisticated investors (e.g., Nagel, 2005; Campbell 
et al., 2008; Conrad et al., 2014). Our findings of no distress anomaly in stocks fully owned 
by individuals are inconsistent with this limit-to-arbitrage based explanation. Our findings 
suggest that the demand pressure associated with preferences of sophisticated investors and 
changes in their preferences drives the distress anomaly. In this respect, we provide new 
explanations why the anomaly cannot be arbitraged away.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents data and estimating distress risk. 
The empirical results are provided in section three and section four presents the conclusions.   
2. Data and distress risk estimation 
Our sample stocks include non-financial firms that have A-shares listed on the main boards of 
the Shanghai and the Shenzhen stock exchanges. Market and accounting information for the 
sample stocks is downloaded from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database provided by the GTA Information Technology. The sample period covers years 
from 1998 to 2012. We extract quarterly information on institutional ownership available for 
all sample stocks from CSMAR for the period from Q1: 2003 to Q4: 2012. As the frequency 
of the filings of institutional ownership is quarterly, we assume that the ownership in stocks 
stays constant during the months of a quarter in our monthly-based analysis. There are eight 
types of institutional investors on the Chinese stock markets, namely mutual funds, securities 
firms, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), insurance firms, trusts, pension funds, 
private equities, and others (including firm annuities, finance companies, banks and 
non-finance companies). In empirical analysis, we use institutional ownership (IO) on stock 
level, which is the percentage of a firm’s tradable A-shares owned by all institutional 
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investors to the firm’s total tradable A-shares.6 Thus, we assume that a giant fund including 
all institutional investors has ownerships in the stock.   
The Chinese stock markets operate the special treatment program (ST) for firms near distress. 
In general, a listed firm will have an “ST” tag in front of its trading name assigned by the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges if the firm meets one of three conditions: (i) continuous 
financial losses in last two fiscal years; (ii) the firm’s total market capitalization lower than 
its registered capital (i.e. the par value of shares); (iii) terminated business operations that 
cannot be restored in three months due to natural disasters, serious production accidents, or 
filed lawsuits (or arbitration) with amounts more than 50% of the firm’s net asset value. The 
three categories generalize distress circumstances that are consistent with the findings of 
Altman (2006).
7
   
In the sample period, we have a total of 545 ST cases.
8
 Most of them are triggered by 
corporate events leading to weak financial conditions including significant losses in two 
consecutive years and negative book equity values (467 cases), extraordinary losses in the 
prior year and operational suspensions (15 cases), bankruptcy filings (6 cases), significant 
losses occurred in financial investments and loan guarantees (5 cases), and lawsuits against 
loan obligations or loan guarantees (10 cases). The remaining cases (42) are caused by delays 
in publishing financial reports, failures to rectify material accounting errors or false 
accounting records before mandatory dates, and auditors’ disclaimer of opinion or auditors’ 
negative opinions on firms with material misstatement. Overall, the 545 ST cases indicate 
that ST tagged firms are in distress. Since ST tags assigned by the exchanges are also public 
                                                          
6 In addition to tradable A-shares, many stocks also have non-tradable A-shares during our sample period. Prior 
to 2005, non-tradable shares which were mostly held by the state and legal persons cannot be traded freely in the 
stock markets (e.g. Li et al. 2011). Since 2005, the Split Share Structure Reform in China started to gradually 
convert these restricted shares to tradable shares, resulting in an increase in the total tradable shares on the 
market. As non-tradable shares cannot be traded by institutions, they cannot generate the demand shock that 
changes the price of stocks with different levels of distress risk. Therefore, in this paper, we measure IO by the 
institutional holdings of tradable A-shares over the number of total tradable A-shares outstanding rather than the 
number of total A-shares outstanding, which include the non-tradable shares. All of our conclusions remain 
unchanged when we use the number of total A-shares outstanding to scale institutionally owned shares. 
7
Altman (2006, pp.4-8) argues that unsuccessful and distressed business enterprises can result in various states 
including failure, insolvency, default and bankruptcy, while bankruptcy is the worst consequence of corporate 
distress. Default businesses in most cases are able to avoid formal bankruptcy filing by negotiating with 
creditors (Gilson et al., 1990; Gilson, 1997). 
8
Appendix 1 provides a summary on all ST cases in our sample period.  
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warning signals for investors before making investment decisions on distressed stocks, the 
probability of ST is a good proxy for distress risk in the context of the Chinese stock markets. 
Following Ohlsen (1980), Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), we adopt a dynamic 
panel logit model to estimate the probability of distress (PD). Specifically, the dependent 
variable is a dummy that equals one in year t when a firm is tagged with ST, and zero 
otherwise. As ST events in year t are based on the released annual report of year t-1, we lag 
accounting variables (i.e. the independent variables) by one more year (i.e., year t-2) to 
predict ST events in year t. We specify distress prediction models in the following procedures. 
First, we use the accounting variables proposed by Ohlson (1980), namely total assets (TA), 
total liabilities to total assets (TLTA), working capital to total assets (WCTA), current 
liabilities to total assets (CLCA), net income to total assets (NITA), funds from operations to 
total liabilities (FUTL) and changes in net income (CHIN).
9
  Preliminary results indicate that 
the size variable TA and the liquidity variables WCTA and CLCA are not statistically 
significant in predicting the distress events. Therefore, we exclude TA, WCTA and CLCA in 
the logit regression. Second, we find that cash and short-term assets to the total assets 
(CASHTA) suggested by Campbell et al. (2008) and sales to total assets (SALETA) used by 
Altman (1968) are statistically significant in the distress prediction model. We include these 
two additional variables, resulting in a total of six variables (i.e. TLTA, NITA, FUTL, CHIN, 
SALETA, and CASHTA) in the prediction model. Table 1 reports the results.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 provides four specifications for the distress prediction models as the availability of 
accounting information is different across the sample years. For example, the information on 
FUTL is available from 1998 onwards while CASHTA is available from 1998 until 2007. In 
the four specifications all the variables are significant with the expected signs. Specifically, 
the significantly negative signs on FUTL and CASHTA indicate that firms with more funds 
from operations and short-term assets are less likely to be ST firms. The leverage variable 
(TLTA) shows that a high level of debts leads to high distress risk. Operational performance 
variables including NITA, CHIN and SALETA have significantly negative relationships with 
                                                          
9
See Ohlsen (1980) for details on these variables’ definitions. We exclude two dummy variables used by Ohlson 
(1980). The two dummy variables are OENEG, which equals to one if the net worth of the firm is negative, and 
INTWO, which equals to one if net incomes are negative in the last two years. These two financial conditions 
have already been specified in the ST criteria.  
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distress risk, indicating that firms with better operational performance have low distress risk. 
In Panel B, we report each model’s sensitivity and specificity ratios related to the power of 
prediction. The sensitivity ratio indicates the probability that the model can correctly predict 
an ST case, while the specificity ratio measures the probability that the model can correctly 
predict a non-ST case. The results show that our models can achieve more than 80% rate to 
predict ST and non-ST cases. For each year from 1998 to 2012, we calculate the probability 
of ST (i.e., PD) for each stock by using one of the models dependent on the availability of 
historical accounting information.
10
  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Indentifying the distress anomaly 
We use estimated PD to construct distress-based portfolios. At the beginning of each year, we 
sort all sample stocks into decile portfolios according to a firm’s PD. The decile portfolios 
are rebalanced each year from 2003 to 2012 and we calculate monthly returns to each decile 
portfolio between January and December of the year.
11
 Differences in returns between the 
bottom and the top decile portfolios are defined as the distress premium. The time-series 
returns then are regressed on the Fama-French-Carhart (Fama and French, 1993; 1996; 
Carhart, 1997) four-factor model (FF-4F) to obtain risk-adjusted returns. Table 2 shows the 
results with Panel A for value-weighted returns and Panel B for equally weighted returns.
12
 
Panel C reports characteristics for each distress decile portfolio.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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For example, we use model 2 to estimate PD in 1998 and 1999 as FUTL is not available before 1998.  
Similarly, we use model 4 to estimate PD in post-2009 as CASHTA is only available until 2007. In other sample 
years, the ST probabilities are estimated using model 3, which include all six accounting variables. For every 
year, the ST risk prediction use only available historically available data to eliminate look-ahead bias.  
11
The analysis of the distress puzzle starts from 2003 in which the data of institutional ownership is available. 
The results based on the early sample years are available upon request.  
12
In untabulated results, we find that there is abnormal market performance in the calendar months of the 
Chinese New Year in China. During the ten-year period (2003 to 2012),  the Chinese New Year falls  in 
January four times and in February six times. The value-weighted market return in the months of the Chinese 
New Year is 7.54% while the return outside the months of the Chinese New Year is only 0.48%.  Furthermore, 
the market return in months of the Chinese New Year is 4.02% higher than the market return in January and 
1.92% higher than the market return in February, suggesting that abnormally high returns in months of the 
Chinese New Year are neither January nor February effect. To control for these abnormally high returns, we 
exclude the months of the Chinese New Year in our monthly return calculation. However, our conclusions do 
not change when we include all calendar months.  
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The first row in Panel A shows that, for the value-weighted returns, the bottom and the top 
distress decile portfolios have monthly returns of 1.04% and -0.37%, respectively. The 
distress premium is 1.41% per month with t-statistics 2.37. In terms of risk-adjusted returns, 
the least and the most distressed portfolios have monthly returns of 0.76% and -1.06%, 
respectively, resulting in a return of 1.82% per month for the distress premium. Panel B 
shows equally weighted returns for the decile portfolios. The raw and risk-adjusted distress 
premiums are both significantly positive, suggesting that FF-4F risk adjustments are unable 
to explain the distress premium.
13
  
In Panel C, we show each distress portfolio’s characteristics. These characteristics are 
calculated from the time-series averages of cross-sectional means for each portfolio 
(Appendix A2 provides details on characteristic variables). By construction, PD increases 
monotonically across the portfolios. The bottom portfolio has the contemporaneous level of 
IO of 16.41%, while the level of IO is only 2.87% for the top portfolio. In addition, the level 
of IO decreases across the decile portfolios, implying the negative relationship between IO 
and PD. This evidence also suggests that institutional investors may have preferences to hold 
low distressed stocks. In the second row, the results show that on average the most distressed 
stocks are nearly three times smaller than the least distressed stocks in terms of market 
capitalization (i.e., 2.21 against 7.00). In addition, the least distressed stocks tend to be 
growth stocks with the lowest book to market ratios (BTM) of 0.41. But the top decile 
portfolio’s BTM is 0.47 very similar to other portfolios. This is inconsistent with the notion 
that BTM is a proxy for distress risk (e.g. Fama and French, 1993; 1996).
14
 In following rows, 
we report each portfolio’s volatility, return skewness and past performance. We find that 
returns to the most distressed stocks are generally more volatile than the least distressed 
stocks (i.e. 3.41% against 2.95%). In addition, returns to the least distressed stocks are more 
skewed than the most distressed stocks (i.e. 0.24 against 0.16). This evidence contrasts with 
the U.S. finding that distressed stocks are more positively skewed than safe stocks (e.g. 
Campbell et al., 2008; Conrad et al., 2014), implying that distressed stocks are less likely to 
have a lottery-like feature in the Chinese stock markets. In terms of past returns, the most 
distressed stocks are recent losers. However, the rest of the portfolios have similar past 
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 The distress premium is also robust to transaction costs.  
14
 Griffin and Lemmon (2002) disagree with BTM as a proxy for distress risk and they show that there is a 
non-linear relationship between distress and BTM. Our results here seem to be consistent with Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002).   
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12-month returns. The last two rows reveal two aspects of liquidity, namely the price impact 
(Amihud, 2002) and trading speed measured by a share’s turnover ratio in the past 12 months. 
The least distressed stocks are more liquid than the most distressed stocks in terms of the 
liquidity measure of price impact. In contrast, the most distressed stocks have a higher share 
turnover ratio than the least distressed stocks (i.e. 2.67% against 1.95%), consistent with the 
findings of Da and Gao (2010). Overall, the results show the presence of the distress anomaly 
in China and also imply that institutional ownership has a close relationship with distress risk. 
3.2 Resolving the distress anomaly 
To investigate the relation between distress anomaly and institutional ownership, we 
independently sort the sample stocks into quintile portfolios based on IO and PD. This 
double-sorting procedure generates 25 IO-PD based portfolios. Since each stock’s IO is 
reported on a quarterly basis, the 25 portfolios are rebalanced quarterly. The results are 
reported in Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Panel A reports the number of stocks in each portfolio. In the fifth IO quintile only 16 stocks 
belong to the most distressed portfolio while 84 stocks belong to the least distressed portfolio. 
In contrast, in the first IO quintile 100 stocks fall in the category of the highest PD and 41 
stocks fall in the category of the lowest PD. Panel B shows the percentage of PD for each 
portfolio. The highest PD (19.79%) appears in the first IO quintile. These results indicate a 
negative relationship between IO and PD, consistent with our prior that institutional investors 
have a strong aversion to distressed stocks.  
For each given IO category, we calculate the distress premium as differences in returns 
between the lowest and the highest PD quintile portfolios. Each column in Panel C and D 
displays the equally weighted and value-weighted distress premiums within each IO group. In 
the last row, we report the p-value of the GRS test (Gibbons et al., 1989) with the null 
hypothesis that the five risk-adjusted premiums across IO quintiles are jointly equal to zero. 
In Panel C, the results show that distressed stocks have significantly higher returns than safe 
stocks in the third, the fourth and the fifth IO quintiles, suggesting that distress risk is priced 
in these portfolios. With the p-value of the GRS test near to zero, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the five risk-adjusted distress premiums are jointly equal to zero. In Panel D, 
14 
 
the five value-weighted distress premiums are all insignificantly different from zero across 
the five IO quintiles. The GRS test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the five risk-adjusted 
premiums are jointly equal to zero. Collectively, these results indicate that the distress 
anomaly disappears after controlling for the contemporaneous level of IO, suggesting that 
institutional investors play an important role in explaining the distress anomaly.  
3.3 Institutional growth and institutional preferences  
In this section, we examine whether institutions exhibit the growth in scale or incur changes 
in preferences, which are two key characteristics underlying the institutional growth 
hypothesis and the preference-change hypothesis.  
3.3.1 The growth of institutional investors 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports averaged IO across the first quarter to the last quarter in each sample year 
from 2003 to 2012. Panel A and B show the percentage of IO and the percentage of market 
capitalization held by eight groups of institutional investors, respectively. Institutional 
investors begin to hold only 1.88% of tradable shares in 2003. Since then, the overall 
institutional ownership experiences the strong growth and reaches the peak of 11.46% in 
2007. In following years, the institutional ownership gradually declines, ending up with 7.88% 
of total tradable shares in 2012. Panel A also shows that mutual funds’ holdings represent the 
largest share on the markets compared with the other seven groups of institutional investors. 
Panel B shows the proportion of market value owned by institutions. The percentage numbers 
are larger than those reported in Panel A, suggesting that institutional holdings tilt towards 
large stocks (i.e., preferences for large stocks). Panel B also shows that the market value of 
the institutional share dramatically increases from 2003 (4.63%) to 2007 (22.36%). Since 
2008, institutions have incurred a decline of the market share. The results in Panel A and B 
suggest that the institutional growth may play a role in the distress anomaly only in the earlier 
sub-period (2003-2007). When institutions have preferences for stocks with low distress, the 
fast growth of institutions over that period may generate demand shocks to shift the overall 
market demand to safe stocks. These demand shocks can drive safe stocks’ valuations higher 
than distressed stocks (e.g. Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Campbell et al., 2008).  
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3.3.2 Institutional preferences 
Next, we turn our attention to the issue whether institutions experience any change in 
distress-based preferences. This change suggests that the negative relationship between 
distress risk and IO may exhibit different magnitudes over time. To test this, we regress IO on 
the level of distress risk (PD) and other stock characteristics including size, book-to-market, 
turnover, illiquidity, price, momentum, skewness and volatility, which are well-known 
determinants for IO (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Yan and 
Zhang, 2009) (see Appendix 2 for details). Following Bennett et al., (2003), we estimate 
quarterly cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with standardized variables to 
eliminate the impact of scale changes in variables (e.g. changes in the overall share of 
institutional investors over time) on estimated coefficients. Specifically, each firm’s 
characteristic is subtracted by the cross-sectional mean and divided by the cross-sectional 
standard deviation in each quarter. Coefficients estimated by standardized regressions are 
scale free and allow us to compare coefficients on each variable across different sub-periods. 
Panel A in Table 5 reports the results.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The first row in Panel A reports the results over the entire sample period. We find that IO is 
significantly and negatively related to PD. This result confirms our prior that investors have 
preferences for stocks with low distress risk
15
. We also find that large, high price, and growth 
stocks are attractive to institutional investors, consistent with institutional preferences 
documented in the U.S. markets (e.g. Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett et al., 2003; 
Kumar, 2009; Conrad et al., 2014). The negative coefficient on turnover implies that 
institutions have a strong aversion to stocks with high turnover. The positive coefficient on 
momentum suggests that institutions are positive feedback traders.  
To examine whether institutional preferences have changed over time, in rows (2) to (5) we 
partition the analysis into four 2.5-year (i.e. 10 quarters) sub-periods. Our main interest is of 
the coefficient on PD across the four sub-periods. The coefficient on PD is significantly 
positive in the first sub-period and becomes significantly negative in following three 
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 In addition, these preferences are present across almost all types of institutional investors in our sample and 
are not driven by any particular dominating investors (e.g. mutual funds).
 
These results are available upon 
request.  
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sub-periods. Across the four sub-periods, the coefficients monotonically decrease. We also 
find that differences in the coefficient on PD between the first, the second and the third 
sub-periods are statistically significant (in the untabulated results). Changes in the sign and 
the magnitude of the coefficient indicate that institutions have changed their distress-based 
preferences by increasing their holdings of safe stocks relative to distressed stocks. This 
finding is consistent with our hypothesis that institutional preferences for stocks with low 
distress risk are increasing over time
16
. This result is also consistent with the US evidence 
documented in Conrad et al., (2014). They find that institutional ownership in the median 
firm increases (due to the strong growth of institutions in the U.S.) faster than that of high 
distressed stocks, implying that institutions increase their aversion to distress risk.  
The following columns provide the results for other institutional preferences across the four 
sub-periods. The coefficient on BTM is negative in the first two sub-periods and is positive in 
the last two sub-periods, suggesting that institutions have shifted their preferences from 
growth stocks to value stocks. The variable of size has a positive coefficient, while the 
magnitude of this coefficient declines sharply from 0.410 in the first sub-period to 0.105 in 
the last sub-period (and the difference of 0.305 is highly significant in the untabulated results). 
This evidence implies that institutions exhibit a weaker preference for large stocks in the 
most recent sub-period than in the first sub-period. The results also show that institutions 
have changed their liquidity-based preferences for holding more stocks with low turnover, 
high liquidity, and high-price from the first sub-period to the third sub-period. However, the 
preference for positive feedback trading does not incur any change as the coefficient on 
momentum is positive across the four sub-periods. The variable of skewness has a significant 
negative coefficient in the first sub-period and the coefficient turns to be significantly 
positive in the third sub-period, implying that institutions incur a weak change in preferences 
for skewness. The significant and negative relationship between IO and volatility in the last 
two sub-periods suggests that institutions increase their preferences for stocks with low 
volatility.    
Finally, in row (6) we compare coefficients on each variable between the first two 
sub-periods and the last two sub-periods to test changes in institutional preferences over the 
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 We also find that changes in institutional distress-based preferences are a pervasive phenomenon across 
different types of institutional investors and are not confined to any one particular group of institutional 
investors over time. These results are available upon request. 
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whole sample period. Similar to previous results, institutional preferences have shifted to low 
distress, high liquid and low volatility stocks, while institutional holdings move away from 
large and growth stocks. These changes in institutional preferences might not be a 
coincidence. Although institutions have historical preferences for large and growth stocks, 
their preferences have shifted to small and value stocks to exploit informational advantages 
(e.g. Bennett et al., 2003). As small and value stocks are perceived to be risky, institutions 
have significantly increased their preferences for stocks with low risk including low distress 
risk, low liquidity risk and low total risk.  
3.3.3 Distress risk and institutional demand 
Consistent with changes in distress-based preferences, the relationship between PD and IO 
becomes more negative over time. This evidence indicates that institutions have raised their 
holdings of safe stocks relative to distressed stocks. This reallocation of institutional funds 
implies that the level of distress risk can negatively predict subsequent change of institutional 
holding.
17
 Alternatively, as the level of IO represents institutional preferences, changes in 
levels of IO can indicate a change in preferences. Increasing preferences for low distress risk 
over time suggests that distress risk would have a negative relationship with future changes in 
levels of IO (i.e., subsequent institutional demand).  
We use two measures for subsequent institutional demand, which are derived from a raw 
measure of changes in institutional ownership, to control for market-wide influences. The raw 
measure of ΔIO takes the difference of institutional ownership on a stock i from quarter q-1 
to quarter q (i.e., 1,,,  qiqiqi IOIOIO ). Firstly, when institutional investors have attracted 
more funds from individuals, institutions have to buy more stocks for investment. Hence, the 
institutional demand measured by ΔIO is likely to represent the mixed effect of the rising 
scale of institutions on the market and changes in institutions’ own preferences. To control 
for the impact of growing institutions on institutional holding
18
, we use changes in 
standardized institutional ownership (i.e., ΔSIO) to proxy for changes in institutional 
preferences. We define ΔSIO as follows. 
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 Since institutional investors’ change of holdings can also be motivated by reasons other than changes in 
preferences. In section 3.5, we explore whether change of holdings motivated by other reasons can explain the 
distress anomaly.  
18Our conclusions remain if we use ΔIO instead of ΔSIO to measure institutional demand.   
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qIO  and 1qIO  are the average of institutional ownership for all sample stocks in quarters q 
and q-1, respectively. qIO and 1qIO are standard deviations of institutional ownership for 
all sample stocks in quarters q and q-1, respectively. 
Secondly, the raw measure of ΔIO can be positively correlated with market capitalization and 
initial institutional ownership. Sias (2007) and Choi and Sias (2012) find that institutions are 
more likely to hold large stocks, suggesting a positive relationship between the level of IO 
and firm size. We have similar findings shown in Table 4. Following Sias (2007) and Choi 
and Sias (2012), we compute our second measure of institutional demand: the adjusted ΔIO 
(i.e., Adj_ΔIO). The adjusted ΔIO is the change in the fraction of tradable shares held by 
institutions for stock i in quarter q less the average quarter q change for stocks within the 
same capitalization quintile (Q) divided by the cross-sectional mean fraction of tradable 
shares held by institutions in that quarter for stocks within the same capitalization quintile as 
specified in Equation (2). Adj_ΔIO measures the abnormal change in institutional ownership 
compared to similar-sized stocks.  
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We regress ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO, on firm characteristics, respectively. Panel B in Table 5 
report results. The first two rows in Panel B show that the level of distress risk (PD) 
negatively and significantly predicts subsequent institutional demand in the next quarter.
19 
This evidence suggests that institutions tend to reduce (increase) their holdings of a stock that 
has a high (low) level of distress risk during our sample period. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the institutional investors have increased (decreased) their preferences for 
stocks with low (high) distress risk. Furthermore, changes in distress-based preferences can 
cause demand shocks which may occur over many quarters, suggesting that the predictive 
power of PD to future institutional demand should go beyond one quarter. Consistent with 
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 The level of distress risk is a prediction variable and is of our main interest in this study. We do not test how 
institutional investors will react to changes in distress risk, which has already documented in previous studies 
(e.g. Conrad et al., 2014) 
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this, the results in rows (3)-(5) show that PD also predicts subsequent institutional demand in 
the next two, four, and eight quarters. The coefficient on PD is larger (in absolute value) 
when a prediction horizon becomes longer, implying that changes in distress-based 
preferences of institutions are persistent over time.
20
    
3.4 Testing the institutional growth hypothesis and the preference-change hypothesis 
Our previous results show that the growth of institutions and changes in institutional 
preferences are both present on the Chinese equity markets. In this section, we decompose the 
level of IO into two components including lagged IO and changes of IO to examine whether 
the institutional growth hypothesis or the preference-change hypothesis can explain the 
distress anomaly. The two hypotheses are the key for us to understand the distress anomaly.  
Under the institutional growth hypothesis, the growth of the institutional market share 
generates demand shocks for institutionally preferred stocks giving rise to their prices. 
Specifically, when the institutional market share increases, the size of demand shocks should 
be dependent on the degree of institutional preferences. That is, stocks with high levels of IO 
in quarter t-1 would have greater demand shocks in quarter t. Thus, the level of IO in quarter 
t-1 can be a proxy for demand shocks in quarter t. If the institutional growth hypothesis holds, 
we expect that lagged IO proxied for demand shocks induced by growing institutions 
explains away the distress anomaly. In contrast, if institutional preferences change, 
cross-sectional IO levels in quarter t-1 will be less informative about institutions’ new 
preferences. Instead, cross-sectional IO levels in quarter t should reflect the new preferences. 
In this case, changes in IO levels from quarter t-1 to quarter t can be a proxy for changes in 
preferences. Under the preference-change hypothesis, we expect the distress anomaly to 
disappear after controlling for ΔSIO or Adj_ΔIO.21As we discussed before, our measures of 
ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO have advantages over the raw measure of changes in IO (i.e. ΔIO).  
3.4.1. Portfolio analysis 
 [Insert Table 6 and 7 about here] 
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 Please note that the coefficients on momentum in Panel B of Table 5 are not significantly positive suggesting 
that it is not the past performance of the stock returns that has caused the demand shock.  
21
The results remain if the raw ΔIO is used in this double sorting portfolio analysis. These results are available 
upon request.    
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We undertake the portfolio approach to double sorting lagged IO, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO against 
PD, respectively, for the whole sample period (2003-2012). The sorting procedure is the 
same as in the section 3.2. Table 6 reports the results. Panel A, B and C are for the lagged IO, 
ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO respectively. Panel A-1 shows that the distress premium is significantly 
positive in the first, the fourth and the fifth lagged IO quintiles. The three distress premiums 
remain significantly positive after adjusting risk factors. In Panel A-2, two out of the five 
premiums are significantly positive in both raw and risk-adjusted returns. The two p-values of 
the GRS test in Panel A-1 and A-2 are near to zero, suggesting that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the distress premiums across lagged IO quintiles are jointly equal to zero. 
These results imply that the distress premium is still present after controlling for lagged IO. 
Panel B report the results based on double sorting ΔSIO and PD. For each level of distress 
risk, portfolio returns monotonically increase across ΔSIO quintiles. In the highest ΔSIO 
quintile, the five portfolios across different levels of distress all have high returns above 3% 
per month. This result suggests that ΔSIO may have a large impact on stock prices. More 
importantly, Panel B-1 shows that none of the distress premiums is significantly different 
from zero across ΔSIO quintiles. The p-value of the GRS test is 0.35, suggesting that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the five premiums are jointly equal to zero. In Panel B-2, on 
a value-weighted basis, the five distress premiums in raw and risk-adjusted returns are all 
insignificant. Consistent with this, Panel C-1 and Panel C-2 show that raw and risk-adjusted 
distress premiums are insignificant across each Adj_ΔIO quintile. Our primary results reveal 
that changes in IO rather than lagged IO are able to explain the negative relationship between 
PD and returns in the whole sample period, consistent with our preference-change 
hypothesis. 
However, institutions in China experienced the strong growth from 2003 to 2007. Can this 
growth be responsible for the distress anomaly over that particular sub-period? To answer 
this question, we repeat the analysis by separating the whole sample period into the earlier 
(2003-2007) and the later (2008-2012) sub-periods. Table 7 provides the results. To save 
space, we only report the distress premium across lagged IO, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO quintiles, 
respectively. In the earlier sub-period, the five distress premiums across lagged IO quintiles 
are insignificantly different from zero in terms of equally weighted returns. The p-value for 
the GRS test is 0.25, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the risk-adjusted 
premiums being jointly equal to zero. In terms of raw value-weighted returns, the premium 
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within the first lagged IO quintile is significant but becomes insignificant after risk 
adjustments. The p-value of 0.28 for the GRS test suggests that these risk-adjusted premiums 
are jointly indifferent from zero. In the later sub-period, the two distress premiums in equally 
weighted risk-adjusted returns and the three premiums in value-weighted risk returns are 
significantly positive. The low p-values of the GRS test (i.e. 0.05 and 0.03) suggest that we 
can reject the null hypothesis of the five distress premiums being jointly equal to zero. These 
contrasting results imply that lagged IO can explain the distress anomaly only in the earlier 
sub-period, consistent with the institutional growth hypothesis. In following rows, we report 
the distress premium conditional on ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO. The results show that the distress 
premiums are individually and jointly insignificant across ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO quintiles in the 
earlier and the later sub-periods. The evidence suggests that changes in IO explain the 
distress anomaly in both sub-periods. Overall, the institutional growth hypothesis and the 
preference-change hypothesis both explain the distress anomaly in the earlier sub-period, 
while the latter has stronger explanatory power for returns than the former in the whole 
sample period.  
Our results contrast sharply with the findings of Campbell et al., (2008). They find that the 
distress premium is present only in stocks with a low level of IO, consistent with the 
limit-to-arbitrage explanation. Stocks with no (or less) institutional ownership have great 
market frictions, which make institutions difficult and costly to arbitrage away the distress 
anomaly (e.g. Nagel, 2005). Inconsistent with the limit-to-arbitrage explanation, we show that 
the distress anomaly is no longer present after controlling for the contemporaneous level of 
IO, implying that institutions play a key role in the anomaly. Our findings suggest that 
demand shocks associated with institutional investors’ preferences and changes in their 
preferences cause the distress anomaly.  
3.4.2 Cross-sectional analysis  
This section examines the relationship between distress risk and monthly returns by 
controlling for other variables, which influence stock returns, in Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
cross-sectional regressions. Our control variables include turnover in the past 12 months, 
BTM in the last month, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure over the past 12 months, 
market capitalization in the last month in the nature logarithm form, skewness of daily returns 
over the past 12 months, the last month’s return, cumulative past 12 months’ returns and 
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volatility of daily returns over the past 12 months. Firstly, we undertake sub-sample analysis 
by classifying the sample stocks with and without IO (defined as no institutional holdings in 
quarters q and q-1). If the distress anomaly is related to institutions, we expect that the 
anomaly is concentrated in stocks with IO. Secondly, if demand shocks are generated through 
growing institutions, we expect that lagged IO not only can predict returns but also can 
subsume the negative relationship between distress risk and returns. Alternatively, if demand 
shocks are generated through changing institutional distress-based preferences, ΔSIO and 
Adj_ΔIO should be able to account for the anomaly. We report time-series averaged 
coefficients for each variable and associated Newey-West t-statistics in Table 8.   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The first column shows that PD has a significantly negative relationship with returns in all 
sample stocks, consistent with the presence of the distress anomaly. Column (2) shows that 
the coefficient on PD is -0.0016 insignificantly different from zero in the sub-sample of 
stocks without IO. However, in column (3) PD exhibits a negative relationship with returns 
and the coefficient on PD is -0.0147 significant less than 5% level (t-statistics= -2.24). The 
contrasting evidence implies that institutional investors have a much closer relation with the 
anomaly than the individual investors in China. In columns (4) to (6), we use the sub-sample 
of stocks with IO and include lagged IO, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO individually in the regressions in 
the whole sample period. Column (4) shows that PD can still predict stock returns after 
controlling for lagged IO, implying that the institutional growth cannot fully explain the 
distress anomaly. In contrast, with the inclusion of ΔSIO or Adj_ΔIO in the regressions, PD is 
insignificantly positive in column (5) and is insignificantly negative in column (6) (i.e.0.0063 
and -0.0078, respectively). In following columns from (7) to (14), we repeat previous 
analysis by separating the whole sample period into two sub-periods (2003-2007 and 
2008-2012). In column (7) and (8), we show that the distress anomaly is significant in both 
sub-periods. However, PD becomes insignificant in the earlier sub-period after controlling for 
lagged IO in column (9). In addition, lagged IO is significantly positive and is able to predict 
returns. These findings suggest that demand shocks arising from the growth of institutions 
drives the anomaly in the earlier sub-period. In sharp contrast, column (10) shows that PD is 
significantly negative and lagged IO is insignificant. This evidence implies that the 
institutional growth hypothesis cannot explain the anomaly in the later sub-period. This 
makes sense because the institutional market share incurred a decline over that period. In 
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columns (11) to (14), we show that PD has no predicative power for returns after controlling 
for ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO in both sub-periods. This evidence is consistent with the institutional 
preference-change hypothesis that institutions shift their preferences toward safe stocks to 
generate demand shocks, causing higher returns to safe stocks than distressed stocks. Taken 
together, our results indicate that institutional growth and changes in preferences are both 
responsible for the distress anomaly in the first sub-period, while the latter also drives the 
anomaly in the second sub-period.  
The results from control variables are generally consistent with the literature. The two 
liquidity variables (i.e. Turnover and Illiquidity) significantly influence stock returns. Size 
has a negative relationship with stock returns in the whole sample period. We also find that 
Lagged Return has a negative relationship with returns, consistent with month-by-month 
return reversals (e.g. Jegadeesh, 1990; Lehmann, 1990). In addition, Momentum and BTM 
have significant relationships with returns in the earlier sample period. However, volatility 
and Skewness have no significant power to predict returns on the Chinese stock markets.  
3.4.3 Time-series analysis for changes in distress-based preferences 
If changes in institutional distress-based preferences cause the distress anomaly, we would 
expect that the size of the distress premium should be dependent on the degree of these 
changes. To test this hypothesis, we develop a proxy for changes in institutional 
distress-based preferences. As IO levels represent institutional preferences, changes in IO 
levels can be proxied for changes in preferences. We aggregate each stock’s ΔSIO (Adj_ΔIO) 
within the bottom and the top distress deciles to define ΔSIOL (Adj_ΔIOL ) and ΔSIOH 
(Adj_ΔIOH), respectively. Since institutions may exhibit an increase in preferences for safe 
stocks and a decrease in preferences for distressed stocks within a same quarter, we take 
differences on ΔSIO (Adj_ΔIO) between the two decile portfolios22, i.e., ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH and 
Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH , to measure the overall effect of changes in distress-based preferences. 
We rank and separate the sample quarters by ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH or Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH into two 
groups by a 50% cut-off rate. When institutions have a strong change in distress-based 
preferences, for example, large differences on ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH, we expect the distress 
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 As a robustness test, we also use differences in ΔSIO (Adj_ΔIO) between the bottom and the top quintile 
distress-based portfolios to proxy for changes in distress-based preferences. We find similar results. These 
results are available upon request.    
24 
 
premium
23
 to be significantly positive. However, in quarters with a weak change in the 
distressed based preference, for example, small differences on ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH, we expect the 
premium to be insignificant. Table 9 reports the results. 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
Panel A shows that the equally and value-weighted distress premiums are both significantly 
positive in quarters with a strong change in distress-based preferences. However, in quarters 
with a weak change in distress-based preferences, the premiums are insignificantly different 
from zero. Moreover, the distress premiums are significantly different between the two 
groups of quarters. In addition to this non-parametric test, we also undertake a time-series 
approach to regressing the distress premiums on (ΔSIOL –ΔSIOH) and (Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH), 
respectively. The results in Panel B show that the coefficients on (ΔSIOL –ΔSIOH) and 
(Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH ) are both significantly positive, suggesting that the distress premium 
is larger in quarters with a stronger change in distress-based preferences. The overall 
evidence suggests that changes in the distress-based preference of institutions drive the 
distress anomaly, consistent with our institutional preference-change hypothesis.  
3.5 Alternative interpretations of our results  
Our primary results show that our proxies for changes in preferences, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO can 
explain the distress anomaly. However, one may argue that changes in institutional ownership 
also capture institutional demand that is resulted from reasons other than changes in 
preferences. For example, when safe stocks have better past performance than distressed 
stocks, an increase in the holding of the former relative to the latter can be attributable to 
momentum trading taken by institutions (e.g. Sias, 2007; Badrinath and Wahal, 2001). In 
addition, Choi and Sias (2012) find that institutional investors gradually incorporate public 
financial information into stock prices, leading to the positive relation between financial 
strength and stock returns. To the extent that distress risk is negatively correlated to firms’ 
financial strength, institutional investors may gradually increase their demand for 
fundamentally strong (hence safe) stocks. In this case, changes in institutional ownership can 
be the result of institutional investors’ gradual incorporation of firm distress information into 
stock prices. In this section, we test momentum trading and gradual incorporation of distress 
information as alternative explanations for our findings.  
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 Quarterly distress premium is calculated as the average of monthly distress premium within a quarter.  
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3.5.1 Momentum trading 
In terms of momentum trading, the outperformance of safe stocks over distressed stocks in 
the previous quarter leads institutions to increase the holding of safe stocks relative to 
distressed stocks in this quarter. Therefore, the predictive power of distress risk (i.e., PD) to 
ΔSIO (Adj_ΔIO) should be stronger (weaker) in quarters following larger (smaller) 
differences in returns between safe and distressed stocks. In contrast, in our 
preference-change hypothesis, the predictive power of distress risk to institutional demand 
should be stronger (weaker) in same quarters when the distress premium is larger (smaller). 
That is, a larger increase in institutional demand simultaneously causes the greater 
outperformance of safe over distressed stocks. To test two explanations, the distress 
premiums across the sample quarters are separated into a high and low group (i.e. a 50% 
cut-off rate). Panel A in Table 10 reports the results that we regress changes in institutional 
ownership (ΔSIO) on distress risk and other controlling variables in quarters following low 
and high distress premiums. Panel B reports the determinants of changes in institutional 
ownership in the quarters with low and high distress premiums.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Panel A shows that the coefficient on distress risk (i.e., PD) is insignificantly negative after 
safe and distressed stocks experienced large differences on returns. In contrast, PD is 
significantly negative in quarters following small differences on returns between safe and 
distressed stocks. This evidence is inconsistent with the argument that changes in institutional 
ownership represent institutional momentum trading. Panel B shows that PD is significantly 
related to institutional demand in the quarters with high distress premiums, while the 
coefficient on PD is insignificant in the quarters with low distress premiums. This result 
implies that institutional demand co-moves with the distress premium, consistent with the 
preference-change hypothesis.  
3.5.2 Gradual incorporation of distress information   
The co-movement between institutional demand and the distress premium can also be 
consistent with gradual incorporation of distress information. This explanation depicts that 
institutions slowly revise their expectations and gradually increase their holdings of 
financially strong stocks relative to distressed stocks after firm financial information becomes 
26 
 
publicly available. Similar to the preference-change hypothesis, this gradually increased 
institutional demand derived from slow reactions to information can also lead to the 
outperformance of safe stocks over distressed stocks, while a key difference between the two 
explanations is the time period over which institutions need to adjust their holdings. Changes 
in preferences may occur over many quarters and the process of adjustments on institutional 
holdings can span a long time. Consistent with this, our previous results in Table 5 show that 
the relationship between distress risk and IO is significantly different across the earlier and 
the later sub-periods, implying that institutions may need a long time to adjust their holdings. 
However, gradual incorporation of information suggests that the process of adjustments on 
institutional holdings in response to public information will span an information period from 
the time when information is first available until the time just before new information is 
released. Thus, gradual incorporation of information implies that the relationship between 
distress risk and cross-sectional IO levels should be stronger at the end of the information 
period than at the beginning the information period. Since firms listed on the Chinese equity 
markets have financial year end of 31 December and most of firm annual reports are 
available by the end of the first quarter, we define Q2 in year t and Q1 in year t+1 to be the 
beginning and the end of the information period, respectively. In addition, we define Q2 and 
Q3 in year t to be the first half of the information period and Q4 in year t and Q1 in year t+1 
to be the second half of the information period. We regress IO on PD and control variables 
based on quarters in the information period. Similar to the analysis in Table 5, IO and control 
variables are all standardized. As the scale changes on IO and PD over time will not 
influence coefficients in the regressions, we can examine whether the relationship between 
PD and IO will be significantly different across the beginning (the first half) and the end (the 
second half) of the information period. Table 11 report results. 
 [Insert Table 11 about here] 
The results show that the coefficients on PD are not significantly different between the 
beginning and the end of the information period. The results also show that the coefficients 
on PD are not significantly different between the first half and the second half of the 
information period. The evidence suggests that newly available information released on a 
yearly basis does not attract institutional investors to adjust their holdings of safe stocks 
relative to distressed stocks, inconsistent with gradual incorporation of distress information.  
27 
 
4. Conclusions 
The outperformance of safe stocks over distressed stocks is one of most important asset 
pricing anomalies first discovered in the U.S. The literature lacks evidence of and 
explanations for the anomaly in emerging markets. This study is the first, to the best of our 
knowledge, to investigate the causes of the distress anomaly in the Chinese stock markets as 
one of most important emerging economies. We find that the distress anomaly is present in 
the Chinese stock markets. Our results show that the anomaly disappears after controlling for 
institutional ownership. We propose institutional demand shocks based explanations for the 
distress anomaly: the institutional growth hypothesis and the preference-change hypothesis. 
We find that the market share of institutions in China has dramatically increased from 2003 
to 2007, consistent with the growth of institutions. We also find that institutions have 
changed their preferences over the whole sample period. Specifically, institutions have 
increased their preferences for small and value stocks, while institutions become more averse 
to distressed, illiquid and volatile stocks. Our results reveal that the distress anomaly can be 
explained away by lagged institutional ownership in the earlier sub-period (2003-2007) but 
not in the later sub-period (2008-2012). In contrast, the anomaly disappears after controlling 
for changes in institutional ownership in the whole sample period. These key findings are 
also confirmed in cross-sectional regression analysis. Further time-series analysis shows that 
when institutions experience a stronger change in distress-based preferences, the distress 
anomaly becomes greater. Overall, our results suggest that demand shocks arising from the 
growth of institutions and from changes in institutional distress-based preferences drive the 
distress anomaly.  
The evidence from our analysis of alternatively interpretation renders no support for gradual 
incorporation of distress information to explain the distress anomaly. In addition, we exclude 
the momentum trading of institutional investors as the explanation of distress anomaly. We 
showed that, the institutional demand of safe stocks relative to risky stocks did not occur after 
periods with high distress anomaly. Hence this rules out the potential endogenous 
relationship between institutional demand and returns (i.e. past returns driving the demand).  
Our study supports the importance of institutional preferences for understanding the distress 
anomaly (e.g. Campbell et al., 2008). Our results imply that the distress anomaly can be 
transient mispricing if institutional investors encounter constraints to grow. For example, 
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further fast growth would be limited when institutions have already held a larger scale of 
shares than individuals. Also, our results imply that an increasing institutional aversion to 
distress risk may be related to changing style investing from large and growth stocks to small 
and value stocks which are perceived to be risky. If future competition among institutions 
diminishes information advantages to be exploited in small and value stocks (e.g. Bennett et 
al., 2003), institutions will not have any need to change their distress-based preferences and 
nor will the anomaly survive. Although the distress anomaly is of focus in this study, our 
evidence implies that the demand pressure associated with institutional preferences may also 
play roles in other asset pricing anomalies. We leave this issue for future research.    
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Table 1 Dynamic panel logit regressions on ST events prediction 
Panel A: The ST prediction models 
 
Model 1 
1998-2012 
Model 2 
1998-2009 
Model 3 
2000-2009 
Model 4 
2000-2012 
FUTL   -1.629 -1.583 
   (-3.15)*** (-3.50)*** 
CASHTA  -3.285 -2.730  
  (-4.13)*** (-3.30)***  
CHIN -1.439 -1.385 -1.668 -1.675 
  (-8.34)*** (-7.19)*** (-7.50)*** (-8.67)*** 
SALETA -1.420 -1.338 -1.162 -1.220 
  (-7.23)*** (-5.52)*** (-4.56)*** (-5.99)*** 
TLTA 2.169 1.881 1.565 1.868 
 (6.28)*** (4.62)*** (3.55)*** (5.04)*** 
NITA -20.059 -18.718 -16.963 -18.576 
 (-13.02)*** (-10.81)*** (-8.91)*** (-11.19)*** 
Constant -4.125 -3.385 -3.491 -4.173 
  (-18.54)*** (-12.19)*** (-11.38)*** (-17.16)*** 
     
Observations 13,513 8,839 8,044 12,718 
Pseudo-R
2
 0.365 0.363 0.380 0.381 
     
Panel B:The performance of the ST prediction models 
Sensitivity 81.78% 80.27% 81.62%  82.79% 
Specificity 87.84% 87.27% 88.02% 88.37% 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the ST events on predictor variables. We use the following 
variables: funds from operations to total liabilities (FUTL), the ratio of a company’s cash and short-term assets 
to the total assets (CASHTA), change in net income (CHIN), sales to total assets (SALETA), total liabilities to 
total assets (TLTA), and net income to total assets (NITA). The sensitivity ratio indicates the probability that the 
model can correctly predict a ST case, while the specificity ratio measures the probability that the model can 
correctly predict a non-ST case. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2 Identifying the distress puzzle 
PD deciles 1 (low) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 (high) 1-10 
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolio returns 
Monthly return 1.04 0.61 0.68 0.19 0.51 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.18 -0.37 1.41 
t-statistics (1.18) (0.64) (0.71) (0.19) (0.50) (0.30) (0.28) (0.35) (0.17) (-0.33) (2.37)** 
FF-4F Alpha 0.76 0.12 0.16 -0.29 -0.04 -0.29 -0.27 -0.32 -0.50 -1.06 1.82 
t-statistics (3.51)*** (0.53) (0.73) (-1.32) (-0.01) (-1.35) (-1.14) (-1.50) (-2.18)** (-4.19)*** (5.84)*** 
 
Panel B: Equally weighted portfolio returns 
Monthly return 1.05 0.71 0.88 0.69 0.66 0.48 0.63 0.76 0.61 0.04 0.99 
t-statistics (1.08) (0.72) (0.87) (0.68) (0.64) (0.46) (0.59) (0.69) (0.56) (0.04) (2.01)** 
FF-4F Alpha 0.56 0.13 0.29 0.09 0.04 -0.18 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.66 1.21 
t-statistics (2.72)*** (0.70) (1.55) (0.51) (0.22) (-1.05) (-0.25) (0.00) (-0.41) (-2.86)*** (4.34)*** 
# of stocks 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
  
Panel C: Characteristics of portfolios 
PD (%) 0.08 0.21 0.37 0.57 0.82 1.14 1.64 2.54 5.20 27.74 
 IO (%) 16.41 12.39 10.05 9.18 7.85 7.32 6.41 5.62 4.55 2.87 
 Size (×10
9
) 7.00 6.50 5.17 4.25 3.03 3.44 3.23 3.20 3.10 2.21 
 BTM 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.47 
 Volatility (%) 2.95 3.02 3.09 3.11 3.15 3.16 3.24 3.20 3.24 3.41 
 Skewness 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.16 
 Momentum 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.14 
 Illiqudity (×10
9
) 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.45 0.34 0.37 
 Turnover (%) 1.95 2.12 2.31 2.30 2.39 2.34 2.41 2.44 2.51 2.67 
 Panel A and Panel B report value-weighted and equally weighted monthly returns on probability of distress (PD) portfolios from 2003 to 2012. The PD is estimated from the 
distress prediction model. The return difference between the bottom and the top decile portfolio is defined as the distress premium. The time-series returns are regressed on 
the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model to obtain risk-adjusted returns. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel C reports characteristics for PD decile portfolios. All 
characteristics variables are time-series averages of cross-sectional means across stocks in each portfolio. For each stock, institutional ownership (IO) is defined as the 
percentage of a firm’s tradable shares held by all institutional investors to the total tradable A-shares. Size and BTM are market capitalization and book-to-market ratio, 
respectively. Volatility is the daily return standard deviation in the past 12 months. Skewness is the average daily return skewness in the past 12 months. Momentum is the past 
12-month returns. Illiquidity is the absolute values of monthly returns divided by the total number of shares traded averaged over the past 12 months. Turnover is the number 
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of shares traded divided by the number of tradable shares outstanding averaged over the past 12 months. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 Double-sorting of institutional ownership and distress probability  
Panel A: Number of stocks  Panel B: PD (%) 
 IO   IO 
  1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)    1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
PD 
1  41 19 36 55 84  
PD 
1  0.21 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 
2 59 30 43 50 53  2 0.56 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.43 
3 63 34 47 49 41  3 1.14 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.88 
4 75 38 49 41 30  4 2.35 1.84 1.89 1.81 1.81 
5 100 41 44 32 16  5 19.79 13.76 13.75 12.09 10.85 
               
Panel C: Equally weighted monthly returns  Panel D: Value-weighted monthly returns 
 IO   IO 
  
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   
 
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
PD 
1 0.43 0.28 0.00 0.56 2.54  
PD 
1 -0.06 -0.27 -0.50 0.14 2.06 
 
(0.40) (0.21) (0.07) (0.52) (2.71)***  
 
(-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.44) (0.13) (2.23)** 
2 0.44 0.29 0.38 0.96 2.62  2 0.03 -0.37 -0.44 0.31 1.91 
 
(0.38) (0.21) (0.32) (0.86) (2.68)***  
 
(0.02) (-0.42) (-0.39) (0.29) (2.09)** 
3 0.01 0.35 0.36 0.90 2.78  3 -0.20 -0.14 -0.40 0.31 2.25 
 
(0.06) (0.25) (0.31) (0.80) (2.82)***  
 
(-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.35) (0.28) (2.39)** 
4 0.56 0.70 0.60 1.44 3.07  4 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.11 2.27 
 
(0.52) (0.51) (0.50) (1.16) (2.98)***  
 
(0.04) (-0.01) (-0.08) (0.09) (2.32)** 
5 0.32 0.48 0.60 1.16 3.39  5 -0.30 -0.18 -0.14 0.50 2.82 
 
(0.30) (0.33) (0.97) (0.97) (3.12)***  
 
(-0.83) (-0.20) (-0.11) (0.44) (2.62)** 
       
        
Diff 1-5 0.12 -0.20 -0.60 -0.60 -0.86  Diff 1-5 0.24 -0.10 -0.36 -0.37 -0.76 
  
(0.32) (-0.53) (-2.80)*** (-1.73)* (-1.82)*   
 
(1.32) (-0.56) (-0.94) (-0.76) (-1.40) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
0.11 0.02 -0.64 -0.60 -0.92 
 FF-4F 
alpha 
0.30 0.00 -0.21 -0.29 -0.44 
  
(0.53) (0.08) (-2.67)*** (-1.83)* (-2.14)**   
 
(1.10) (0.23) (-0.59) (-0.62) (-0.89) 
  
  
  
GRS p-value 0.00  GRS p-value 0.22 
This table reports the results of independently sorting portfolios based on institutional ownership (IO) and 
distress probability (PD). Panel A and B reports 25 portfolios’ equally weighted returns and value-weighted 
returns, respectively. The time-series returns of each portfolio are regressed on the Fama-French-Carhart four 
factors model to obtain risk-adjusted returns (FF-4F Alpha). t-statistics associated with each return and alpha 
value are reported in parentheses. The last row in Panel C and Panel D reports the p-value of the GRS test 
(Gibbons et al., 1989) with the null hypothesis that the five risk-adjusted distress premiums are jointly equal to 
zero. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4 Institutional ownership in the Chinese markets  
Year Mutual funds Securities firms QFII Insurance Trusts Pension Private equities Others All 
Panel A: Percentage ownership of tradable shares 
2003 1.463 0.313 0.006 0.000 0.044 0.019 0.000 0.033 1.879 
2004 3.897 0.753 0.053 0.000 0.101 0.171 0.000 0.078 5.054 
2005 5.292 0.743 0.269 0.053 0.104 0.354 0.004 0.088 6.907 
2006 6.176 0.735 0.542 0.314 0.098 0.655 0.019 0.109 8.650 
2007 9.223 0.616 0.418 0.300 0.149 0.357 0.035 0.358 11.456 
2008 8.301 0.394 0.217 0.348 0.217 0.233 0.036 0.644 10.393 
2009 7.037 0.381 0.189 0.335 0.196 0.263 0.052 0.909 9.363 
2010 7.519 0.525 0.160 0.490 0.172 0.306 0.151 1.087 10.411 
2011 5.998 0.571 0.105 0.677 0.182 0.311 0.215 1.092 9.153 
2012 4.919 0.451 0.086 0.652 0.170 0.337 0.197 1.064 7.877 
 
Panel B: Percentage ownership of market value 
2003 4.077 0.416 0.014 0.000 0.055 0.031 0.000 0.047 4.639 
2004 9.918 1.233 0.174 0.000 0.119 0.234 0.000 0.107 11.784 
2005 14.705 1.324 0.691 0.137 0.124 0.645 0.005 0.113 17.746 
2006 14.068 1.356 1.319 1.008 0.110 1.224 0.017 0.247 19.349 
2007 19.111 0.827 0.628 0.609 0.147 0.553 0.016 0.470 22.360 
2008 17.576 0.499 0.357 0.619 0.179 0.237 0.017 0.756 20.240 
2009 12.027 0.401 0.229 0.556 0.211 0.284 0.036 0.896 14.641 
2010 9.486 0.422 0.232 0.522 0.192 0.286 0.084 0.996 12.220 
2011 6.968 0.421 0.148 0.617 0.119 0.263 0.078 0.823 9.437 
2012 6.063 0.374 0.169 0.677 0.117 0.353 0.083 0.899 8.735 
This table provides information on the overall institutional ownership in the Chinese equity markets from 2003 to 2012.  Institutional ownership (IO) is the percentage of a 
firm’s tradable A-shares owned by all institutional investors to the firm’s total tradable A-shares. The institutional ownership is averaged across each quarter from the first 
quarter to the last quarter in a given year for each type of institutional investor. Panel A shows the percentage of institutional ownership in terms of numbers of tradable 
shares and Panel B is for the percentage of institutional ownership in terms of market capitalization. 
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Table 5 Institutional preferences and determinants of future institutional demand 
  PD BTM Size Turnover Illiquidity Price Momentum Skewness Volatility 
Panel A: Relationship between institutional ownership and share characteristics 
(1) The whole period -0.026 -0.044 0.236 -0.103 0.001 0.392 0.033 -0.002 -0.011 
 2003-2012 (-4.01)*** (-2.84)*** (10.95)*** (-5.61)*** (0.16) (24.70)*** (3.53)*** (-0.24) (-1.04) 
(2) Sub-period1 0.027 -0.103 0.410 0.033 0.069 0.287 0.038 -0.027 -0.008 
 2003:Q1-2005:Q2 (5.34)*** (-4.85)*** (18.75)*** (1.63) (6.66)*** (7.39)*** (2.15)** (-2.45)** (-0.52) 
(3) Sub-period2 -0.023 -0.104 0.245 -0.197 -0.036 0.445 0.026 0.005 0.031 
 2005:Q3-2007:Q4 (-2.51)** (-3.30)*** (11.96)*** (-5.14)*** (-3.33)*** (23.01)*** (1.17) (0.38) (1.22) 
(4) Sub-period3 -0.052 0.017 0.171 -0.151 -0.026 0.447 0.039 0.026 -0.034 
 2008:Q1-2010:Q2 (-7.38)*** (0.61) (12.30)*** (-15.10)*** (-3.22)*** (34.64)*** (1.86)* (2.26)** (-1.85)* 
(5) Sub-period4 -0.061 0.023 0.105 -0.094 -0.002 0.390 0.029 -0.012 -0.035 
 2010:Q3-2012:Q4 (-9.33)*** (2.93)*** (9.56)*** (-5.89)*** (-0.16) (22.57)*** (1.87)* (-0.70) (-1.77)* 
(6) Diff: Sub-periods(1-2) 0.058 -0.124 0.188 0.042 0.030 -0.054 -0.002 -0.019 0.036 
 -sub-period(3-4) (6.32)*** (-5.20)*** (6.08)*** (1.16) (1.90)* (-1.74)* (-0.12) (-1.29) (2.33)** 
Panel B: Relationship between future institutional demand and share characteristics 
(1) ΔSIO q,q+1  -0.008  -0.004  -0.007  0.010  0.000  -0.023  0.008  -0.002  -0.012  
  (-2.63)*** (-1.01) (-0.66) (1.99)** (0.07) (-2.51)** (1.14) (-0.44) (-1.71)* 
(2) Adj_ΔIO q,q+1 -0.014 -0.014 0.005 0.022 0.011 -0.026 0.009 0.001 -0.014 
  (-2.00)** (-1.73)* (0.29) (1.46) (1.11) (-0.74) (0.78） (0.16) (-0.99) 
(3) ΔSIOq,q+2 -0.013 -0.005 -0.023 0.026 0.004 -0.044 0.007 0.008 -0.026 
 (-4.63)*** (-0.98) (-2.09)** (3.97)*** (0.56) (-6.33)*** (1.12) (1.82)* (-3.25)*** 
(4) ΔSIOq,q+4 -0.016 0.000 -0.056 0.044 -0.002 -0.077 0.000 0.008 -0.044 
 (-4.28)*** (-0.04) (-3.62)*** (4.56)*** (-0.15) (-7.91)*** (-0.00) (1.35) (-4.10)*** 
(5) ΔSIOq,q+8 -0.022 0.016 -0.125 0.053 -0.020 -0.120 -0.009 0.010 -0.041 
 (-4.41)*** (1.31) (-7.00)*** (3.64)*** (-1.36) (-8.53)*** (-0.85) (1.28) (-3.37)*** 
This table reports quarterly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression results on IO, ΔSIO, and Adj_ΔIO from 2003 to 2012. In Panel A, the dependent variable is IO, the institutional ownership, in 
quarter q. PD is the predicted probability of ST in quarter q. Size is the natural log of the market capitalization for a firm’s tradable shares at the end of quarter q. BTM is the book value of equity 
in the previous financial year divided by total market capitalization at the end of quarter q; Turnover is the average daily turnover during the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. Price is the 
closing price at the end of quarter q. Illiquidity is the ratio of absolute values of monthly returns divided by the total number of shares traded averaged over the past 12 months, ending in quarter 
q. Momentum is the averaged past 12-month returns, ending in quarter q. Volatility is the averaged daily return standard deviation in the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. Skewness is the 
averaged daily return skewness in the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. Each variable is standardized by subtracting the cross-sectional mean value and dividing by the cross-sectional 
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standard deviation. In Panel B, dependent variables are ΔSIOq,q+t and Adj_ΔIOq,q+t which are changes in standardized institutional ownership and adjusted changes of institutional ownership 
between quarter q and quarter q+t. t-statistics associated with each coefficient are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
40 
 
Table 6 Double-sorting between lagged institutional ownership, changes in institutional 
ownership and distress probability  
Panel A-1: Equally weighted monthly returns  Panel A-2: Value-weighted monthly returns 
 Lagged IO   Lagged IO 
 
 
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   
 
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
PD 
1 1.10 0.93 1.15 1.55 1.64  
PD 
1 0.79 1.01 0.57 1.27 1.20 
 
(0.99) (0.67) (1.01) (1.65)* (1.96)**  
 
(0.71) (0.70) (0.48) (1.14) (1.45) 
2 0.78 1.25 1.40 1.67 1.39  2 0.48 0.47 0.66 1.30 1.13 
 
(0.75) (0.90) (1.16) (1.45) (1.43)  
 
(0.43) (0.35) (0.58) (1.16) (1.17) 
3 0.51 1.04 1.34 1.35 1.30  3 0.18 0.64 0.93 0.78 1.32 
 
(0.45) (0.71) (1.11) (1.16) (1.37)  
 
(0.16) (0.44) (0.78) (0.66) (1.38) 
4 0.76 1.49 1.56 1.41 1.84  4 0.55 1.18 0.80 0.76 1.22 
 
(0.65) (0.98) (1.24) (1.16) (1.80)*  
 
(0.47) (0.75) (0.66) (0.63) (1.31) 
5 0.59 0.80 1.25 0.99 1.00  5 0.23 0.22 0.75 0.86 0.93 
 
(0.51) (0.55) (0.99) (1.02) (1.52)  
 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.60) (0.74) (0.85) 
               
Diff 1-5 0.51 0.13 -0.15 0.56 0.65  Diff 1-5 0.56 0.80 -0.18 0.42 0.27 
  
(1.80)* (0.36) (-0.42) (1.70)* (1.94)*   
 
(1.72)* (1.98)** (-0.42) (1.03) (0.41) 
FF-4F alpha 0.50 0.28 0.02 0.60 0.75  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.52 1.09 -0.03 0.60 0.52 
(1.81)* (0.71) (0.35) (1.80)* (2.00)**  (1.73)* (2.53)*** (-0.01) (1.60) (0.87) 
       
GRS p-value 0.00  GRS p-value 0.00 
      
Panel B-1: Equally weighted monthly returns  Panel B-2: Value-weighted monthly returns 
 ΔSIO   ΔSIO 
 
 
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   
 
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
PD 
1 -0.63 0.44 0.35 0.60 3.79  
PD 
1 -0.46 -0.17 0.12 0.61 3.65 
 
(-0.67) (0.37) (0.29) (0.54) (3.84)***  
 
(-0.50) (-0.15) (0.10) (0.58) (3.85)*** 
2 -0.47 0.74 0.35 0.40 3.65  2 -0.99 0.35 -0.37 0.36 3.30 
 
(-0.47) (0.64) (0.29) (0.35) (3.48)***  
 
(-1.00) (0.31) (-0.32) (0.34) (3.19)*** 
3 -0.70 0.46 0.24 0.52 3.58  3 -1.06 0.32 -0.25 0.00 3.34 
 
(-0.70) (0.39) (0.20) (0.46) (3.42)***  
 
(-1.03) (0.27) (-0.21) (0.06) (3.26)*** 
4 -0.31 0.64 0.27 0.94 3.89  4 -1.10 -0.00 -0.23 0.59 3.62 
 
(-0.30) (0.53) (0.23) (0.76) (3.42)***  
 
(-1.09) (-0.03) (-0.20) (0.50) (3.30)*** 
5 -0.60 0.28 0.54 0.75 4.09  5 -0.99 -0.49 0.00 0.38 3.47 
  
(-0.55) (0.76) (0.44) (0.61) (3.53)***   
 
(-0.96) (-0.42) (0.04) (0.30) (3.05)*** 
               
Diff 1-5 -0.02 0.16 -0.20 -0.16 -0.30  Diff 1-5 0.52 0.30 0.13 0.23 0.27 
  
(-0.05) (0.97) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.48)   
 
(0.99) (0.99) (0.35) (0.48) (0.53) 
FF-4F alpha 0.09 0.25 -0.11 0.00 -0.04  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.58 0.42 0.36 0.48 0.54 
(0.30) (1.03) (-0.30) (0.02) (-0.11)  (1.43) (1.38) (0.81) (1.12) (1.18) 
       
GRS p-value 0.35  GRS p-value 0.18 
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Table 6 continued  
Panel C-1: Equally weighted monthly returns  Panel C-2: Value-weighted monthly returns 
       
 Adj_ΔIO   Adj_ΔIO 
  
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   
 
1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
PD 
1 -0.48 0.30 0.35 1.59 4.54  
PD 
1 -0.98 0.19 0.47 1.57 4.23 
 
(-0.49) (0.29) (0.36) (1.55) (4.16)***  
 
(-1.05) (0.19) (0.47) (1.64)* (4.16)*** 
2 -0.53 0.41 0.43 1.57 4.18  2 -0.88 -0.13 0.12 1.79 3.88 
 
(-0.52) (0.38) (0.42) (1.54) (3.89)***  
 
(-0.87) (-0.13) (0.12) (1.70)* (3.64)*** 
3 -0.15 0.04 0.56 1.35 4.31  3 -0.71 -0.31 0.42 1.35 4.16 
 
(-0.15) (0.04) (0.53) (1.29) (3.98)***  
 
(-0.66) (-0.29) (0.39) (1.35) (3.78)*** 
4 0.04 0.36 0.73 1.67 4.31  4 -0.53 -0.20 0.34 1.46 3.96 
 
(0.04) (0.32) (0.65) (1.43) (3.98)***  
 
(-0.49) (-0.18) (0.31) (1.33) (3.49)*** 
5 -0.62 0.38 0.51 1.84 4.23  5 -0.81 -0.09 0.33 1.47 4.03 
 
(-0.56) (0.31) (0.43) (1.49) (3.71)***  
 
(-0.84) (-0.07) (0.29) (1.16) (3.35)*** 
               
Diff 1-5 0.13 -0.04 -0.12 -0.31 0.30  Diff 1-5 -0.17 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.23 
  
(0.07) (-0.10) (-0.26) (-0.68) (0.54)   
 
(-0.26) (0.50) (0.29) (0.17) (0.70) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
-0.00 0.16 0.13 -0.11 0.39  FF-4F 
alpha 
-0.01 0.46 0.56 0.36 0.60 
(-0.01) (0.43) (0.29) (-0.27) (0.72)  (-0.03) (0.47) (1.09) (0.73) (0.99) 
       
GRS p-value 0.67  GRS p-value 0.40 
This table reports three double-sorting results between PD, lagged IO, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO. Lagged IO is institutional 
ownership in the past three months. ΔSIO is the contemporaneous change in standardized IO. Adj_ΔIO is the change 
in the fraction of tradable shares held by all institutions for a stock in quarter q, less the average change in quarter q 
for stocks within the same capitalization quintile, divided by the cross-sectional mean fraction of tradable shares held 
by all institutions in that quarter for stocks within the same capitalization quintile. We form quintile portfolios for 
each of PD, lagged IO, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO. Panel A1 and A2 report equally and value-weighted monthly returns of 25 
portfolios, respectively, when PD interacts with lagged IO. Panel B1 and B2 report equally and value-weighted 
monthly returns to 25 portfolios, respectively, where PD interacts with ΔSIO. Panel C1 and C2 report equally and 
value-weighted monthly returns to 25 portfolios, respectively, when PD interacts with Adj_ΔIO. Each portfolio’s 
time-series returns are regressed on the Fama-French-Carhart four factors model to obtain risk-adjusted returns 
(FF-4F Alpha). t-statistics associated with each alpha value are reported in parentheses. The last row in each panel 
reports the p-value for the GRS test (Gibbons et al., 1989) with the null hypothesis that the five risk-adjusted distress 
premiums are jointly equal to zero. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.    
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Table 7 Sub-period analysis of double-sorted portfolios 
 
Equally weighted monthly returns             Value-weighted monthly returns 
 Lagged IO   Lagged IO 
2003-2007   2003-2007 
 1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
Diff 1-5 0.72 0.73 -0.89 -0.31 0.61  Diff 1-5 1.07 0.74 -0.97 -0.19 0.43 
  
(1.42) (0.88) (-1.41) (-0.65) (0.97)   
 
(2.46)** (1.64) (-1.37) (-0.37) (1.15) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
0.37 0.03 -0.63 -0.22 0.71  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.65 0.52 -0.92 0.13 0.53 
(0.82) (0.04) (-1.14) (-0.46) (1.31)  (1.58) (1.16) (-1.29) (0.28) (1.04) 
       
GRS p-value 0.25  GRS p-value 0.28 
2008-2012   2008-2012 
 1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
Diff 1-5 0.25 0.09 -0.24 0.74 0.70  Diff 1-5 0.03 0.99 0.39 1.08 0.50 
  
(0.83) (0.19) (-0.61) (1.91)* (1.30)   
 
(0.08) (1.51) (0.71) (1.76)* (0.70) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
0.46 0.12 0.13 1.10 0.84  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.49 1.35 1.08 1.45 0.80 
(1.40) (0.25) (0.32) (2.71)*** (1.68)*  (1.02) (1.92)** (2.00)** (2.25)** (1.02) 
       
GRS p-value 0.05  GRS p-value 0.03 
 ΔSIO   ΔSIO 
2003-2007   2003-2007 
 1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
Diff 1-5 0.21 0.68 0.02 0.35 0.12  Diff 1-5 0.89 0.18 0.07 0.49 0.37 
  
(0.36) (0.99) (0.04) (0.61) (0.21)   
 
(1.11) (0.54) (0.10) (0.84) (0.47) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
-0.32 0.36 -0.02 0.70 0.41  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.41 0.31 0.24 0.69 0.64 
(-0.79) (0.62) (-0.05) (1.50) (0.79)  (0.64) (1.45) (0.36) (1.06) (0.92) 
       
GRS p-value 0.35  GRS p-value 0.23 
2008-2012   2008-2012 
 1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
Diff 1-5 -0.25 0.11 -0.40 -0.58 -0.49  Diff 1-5 0.17 0.47 0.27 -0.14 0.19 
  
(-0.52) (0.27) (-0.66) (-1.72) (-0.92)   
 
(0.25) (0.69) (0.36) (-0.23) (0.26) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
0.11 0.38 0.28 -0.31 -0.01  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.72 0.64 0.56 0.09 0.43 
(0.24) (0.95) (0.47) (-0.88) (-0.03)  (0.97) (1.58) (1.29) (0.15) (0.96) 
       
GRS p-value 0.40  GRS p-value 0.15 
 Adj_ΔIO   Adj_ΔIO 
2003-2007   2003-2007 
 1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
Diff 1-5 0.33 0.09 -0.12 -0.40 0.47  Diff 1-5 -0.19 0.15 0.52 0.06 0.16 
  
(0.50) (0.13) (-0.14) (-0.51) (0.47)   
 
(-0.19) (0.15) (0.46) (0.07) (0.14) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
0.04 0.16 0.56 0.13 0.39  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.02 0.39 0.88 0.30 -0.08 
(0.06) (0.25) (0.66) (0.17) (0.36)  (0.06) (0.46) (1.04) (0.91) (-0.06) 
       
GRS p-value 0.45  GRS p-value 0.40 
2008-2012   2008-2012 
 1(low) 2 3 4 5(high)   1(low) 2 3 4 5(high) 
Diff 1-5 -0.35 -0.16 -0.19 -0.02 0.15  Diff 1-5 -0.16 0.45 -0.14 0.13 0.74 
  
(-0.78) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.46) (0.27)   
 
(-0.19) (0.61) (-0.26) (0.17) (0.94) 
FF-4F 
alpha 
0.02 -0.08 0.10 0.44 0.51  FF-4F 
alpha 
0.50 0.60 0.16 0.82 1.09 
(0.06) (-0.14) (0.24) (0.93) (0.81)  (0.57) (1.08) (0.29) (1.18) (1.36) 
       
GRS p-value 0.43  GRS p-value 0.12 
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This table reports the distress premium across lagged IO, ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO quintiles. Lagged IO is institutional 
ownership in the past three months. ΔSIO is the contemporaneous change in standardized IO. Adj_ΔIO is the change in 
the fraction of tradable shares held by all institutions for a stock in quarter q, less the average change in quarter q for 
stocks within the same capitalization quintile, divided by the cross-sectional mean fraction of tradable shares held by all 
institutions in that quarter for stocks within the same capitalization quintile. The results are based upon the regressions 
for two sub-periods, i.e sub-period (2003-2007) and sub-period (2008-2012). t-statistics associated with each alpha 
value are reported in parentheses. The last row in each panel reports the p-value for the GRS test (Gibbons et al., 1989) 
with the null hypothesis that the five risk-adjusted distress premiums are jointly equal to zero. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8 Cross-sectional regression analysis of monthly stock return on distress risk 
 2003-2102 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2007 2008-2012 2003-2007 2008-2012 
 All stocks No IO With IO With IO 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
PD -0.0123 -0.0016 -0.0147 -0.0138 0.0063 -0.0078 -0.0148 -0.0146 -0.0126 -0.0150 0.0097 -0.0085 -0.0059 -0.0084 
 
(-2.35)** (-0.27) (-2.24)** (-1.96)** (0.16) (-1.03) (-2.01)** (-1.86)* (-1.43) (-2.09)** (0.19) (-0.75) (-0.61) (-0.94) 
Lagged IO 
   
0.0214 
  
  0.0377 0.0054     
    
(2.42)** 
  
  (2.75)*** (0.53)     
ΔSIO 
    
0.0423 
 
    0.0453 0.0423   
     
(16.39)*** 
 
    (6.66)*** (14.96)   
Adj_ΔIO 
     
0.0205       0.0185 0.0225 
      
(13.61)***       (5.86)*** (9.99)*** 
Turnover -0.3711 -0.5672 -0.3297 -0.3141 -0.3675 -0.3237 -0.2643 -0.3958 -0.2509 -0.3773 -0.4030 -0.3959 -0.2718 -0.3742 
 
(-5.23)*** (-4.46)*** (-3.23)*** (-3.24)*** (-3.47)*** (-3.04)*** (-1.68)* (-4.06)*** (-1.73)* (-3.74)*** (-2.42)** (-3.11)*** (-1.68)* (-3.68)*** 
BTM 0.0062 0.0059 0.0058 0.0075 0.0126 0.0084 0.0185 0.0049 0.0202 0.0050 0.0211 0.0010 0.0200 0.0013 
 
(1.29) (1.32) (0.98) (1.30) (1.90)* (1.43) (2.36)*** (0.63) (3.16)*** (0.64) (2.42)** (1.11) (2.68)*** (0.20) 
Illiquidity 1.1611 1.3672 1.2454 1.2217 1.1202 1.2228 0.1541 2.3165 0.0922 2.3303 0.0761 2.4132 0.4484 2.8632 
 
(1.79)* (1.63)* (1.74)* (1.74)* (2.92)*** (1.53) (1.51) (1.89)* (1.19) (1.88)* (0.86) (2.63)** (1.94)** (1.80)* 
Size -0.0035 -0.0104 -0.0041 -0.0047 -0.0031 -0.0049 -0.0004 -0.0077 -0.0023 -0.0075 -0.0009 -0.0061 -0.0020 -0.0077 
 
(-1.69)* (-3.62)*** (-2.10)** (-2.74)*** (-2.14)** (-2.63)*** (-0.14) (-3.29)*** (-0.85) (-3.38)*** (-0.35) (-2.16)** (-0.71) (-3.25)*** 
Skewness -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0040 -0.0007 -0.0027 -0.0027 
 
(-0.35) (-0.27) (-1.52) (-1.56) (-1.60) (-1.56) (-1.44) (-0.78) (-1.32) (-0.70) (-1.50) (-0.26) (-1.20) (-0.95) 
Lag Return -0.0508 -0.0774 -0.0380 -0.0383 -0.0698 -0.0492 -0.0282 -0.0475 -0.0288 -0.0476 -0.0367 -0.0670 -0.0378 -0.0650 
 
(-5.98)*** (-5.51)*** (-3.88)*** (-3.89)*** (-6.14)*** (-4.95)*** (-1.82)* (-4.14)*** (-1.85)* (-4.21)*** (-2.35)** (-6.59)*** (-2.47)** (-5.40)*** 
Momentum 0.0070 -0.0015 0.0094 0.0076 0.0106 0.0063 0.0243 0.0053 0.0205 0.0051 0.0257 0.0040 0.0201 0.0030 
 
(1.39) (-0.25) (1.78)* (1.54) (2.00)** (1.28) (3.50)*** (0.99) (3.14)*** (1.05) (3.76)*** (0.86) (3.40) (1.41) 
Volatility -0.0710 0.1029 0.0101 0.0355 0.2906 0.1243 -0.1455 0.1631 -0.0811 0.1501 0.2085 0.2385 0.0000 0.2469 
 
(-0.51) (0.46) (0.05) (0.16) (1.11) (0.54) (-0.46) (0.68) (-0.28) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) (0.00) (1.09) 
Cons 0.0752 0.2224 0.1011 0.1160 0.0867 0.1149 0.0358 0.1658 0.0691 0.1617 0.0406 0.1212 0.0687 0.1601 
 
(1.69)* (3.64)*** (2.27)** (1.40) (2.03)** (2.60)*** (0.42) (2.68)*** (1.17) (2.69)*** (0.78) (1.71)* (1.07) (2.59)*** 
Avg.stocks    1,238 224 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 847 1,201 847 1,201 847 1,201 847 1,201 
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This table reports Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression of monthly stock return on distress probability (PD) and other control variables. PD is predicted probability of ST 
estimated from the distress prediction model. Lagged IO is the level of IO in quarter q-1. ΔSIO is the contemporaneous change in standardized IO. Adj_ΔIO is the change in the 
fraction of tradable shares held by all institutions for a stock in this quarter minus the averaged this quarter change for stocks within the same capitalization quintile divided by the 
cross-sectional mean fraction of tradable shares held by all institutions in that quarter for stocks within the same capitalization quintile. BTM is the book-to-market ratio with the last 
financial year’s book value equity divided by total market capitalization in the last month. Turnover is the average daily turnover during the past 12 months, ending in month t-1. 
Illiquidity is the average ratio of absolute values of monthly returns divided by the total number of shares traded in the past 12 months, ending in t-1. Size is total market 
capitalization in nature logarithm form in month t-1. Skewness is the average daily return skewness in the past 12 months, ending in month t-1. Lagged Return is returns in month t-1. 
Momentum is the average past 12-month returns momentum, ending in month t-1. Volatility is the average daily return standard deviation in the past 12 months, ending in month t-1. 
The time-series averages of coefficients for each variable and associated Newey-West t-statistics are reported in the table. *, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. The first, fourth, fifth and sixth columns report the results for all sample stocks. The second column reports the results for the stocks without any IO. The third, 
seventh, eighth and ninth columns report the results for the stocks with IO.  
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Table 9 The change in the distress-based preference to explain the distress premium  
Panel A: Distress premium in quarters with strong and weak preference change for distress 
 
Equally weighted Value-weighted 
ΔSIO 
Quarters with a strong change in the distress-based 
preference 0.0187 0.0263 
 
(2.82)*** (3.30)*** 
Quarters with a weak change in the distress-based 
preference -0.0103 -0.0119 
 
(-1.46) (-1.14) 
Diff 0.0291 0.0382 
 
(2.99)*** (3.28)*** 
   
Adj_ΔIO 
Quarters with a strong change in the distress-based 
preference 0.0130 0.0160 
 
(1.97)** (1.95)** 
Quarters with a weak change in the distress-based 
preference -0.0056 -0.0027 
 
(-0.82) (-0.32) 
Diff 0.0187 0.0188 
 
(1.97)** (1.80)* 
 
Panel B: Time-series regression of distress premium on preference change for distress 
ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH 0.0862 0.1097 
 (3.27)*** (3.46)*** 
Cons 0.0043 0.0074 
 (0.89) (1.27) 
Adj_R
2
 0.09 0.10 
   
Adj_ΔIOL-Adj_ΔIOH 0.0016 0.0018 
 
(2.31)** (2.10)** 
Cons 0.0006 0.0032 
 
(0.12) (0.52) 
Adj_R
2
 0.04 0.04 
This table reports the results that the change in the distress-based preference on distress explains the distress anomaly. 
We define ΔSIOL (Adj_ΔIOL) and ΔSIOH (Adj_ΔIOH) as changes in preferences of the lowest and highest distress 
portfolio respectively. Differences on changes in preferences between the two decile portfolios i.e., ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH and 
Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH , are proxied for the change in the distress-based preference. We rank the sample quarters by 
ΔSIOL-ΔSIOH or Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH and separate the quarters into two groups by a 50% cut-off rate. The first group 
includes quarters with a strong change in the distress-based preference, while the second group includes quarters with a 
weak change in the distress-based preference. We also undertake a time-series regression approach to regressing the 
distress premiums on (ΔSIOL –ΔSIOH) and (Adj_ΔIOL - Adj_ΔIOH), respectively. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Table 10 Testing other explanations for distress anomaly 
  PD BTM Size Turnover Illiquidity Price Momentum Skewness Volatility 
Panel A: Determinants of the institutional demand (ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO) in quarters following the low and high distress premium 
Low distress premium q-1 ΔSIO 
-0.011  -0.005  0.006  0.018  0.002  -0.017  0.005  -0.001  -0.017  
(-2.16)** (-0.84) (0.37) (2.57)** (0.32) (-1.35) (0.45) (-0.16) (-1.51) 
 Adj_ΔIO 
-0.028  -0.003  -0.006  0.004  0.016  0.021  0.010  0.007  -0.006  
(-2.90)*** (-0.28) (-0.25) (0.19) (1.29) (0.45) (0.58) (0.68) (-0.26) 
           
High distress premium q-1 ΔSIO 
-0.005  -0.003  -0.020  0.002  -0.003  -0.029  0.011  -0.002  -0.007  
(-1.50) (-0.57) (-1.48) (0.34) (-0.43) (-2.13)** (1.26) (-0.50) (-0.81) 
 Adj_ΔIO 
0.000  -0.025  0.015  0.038  0.006  -0.071  0.008  -0.005  -0.021  
(-0.04) (-2.21)** (0.68) (1.80)* (0.42) (-1.37) (0.51) (-0.54) (-1.49) 
 
Panel B: Determinants of the institutional demand (ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO) in quarters with the low and high distress premium 
Low distress premium q ΔSIO 
-0.005  0.000  -0.016  0.012  -0.007  -0.036  0.011  0.001  -0.004  
(-1.26) -(0.03) (-1.01) (1.55) (-0.98) (-2.47)** (1.39) (0.14) (-0.47) 
 Adj_ΔIO 
-0.004  -0.016  0.012  0.039  -0.007  -0.050  0.010  -0.001  -0.020  
(-0.52) (-1.37) (0.50) (1.58) (-0.46) (-0.95) (0.85) (-0.06) (-1.65)* 
           
High distress premium q  ΔSIO 
-0.010  -0.008  0.001  0.008  0.006  -0.011  0.005  -0.004  -0.018  
(-2.47)** (-1.45) (0.08) (1.22) (0.81) (-0.97) (0.42) (-0.78) (-1.87)* 
 Adj_ΔIO 
-0.023  -0.012  -0.002  0.005  0.028  -0.004  0.008  0.003  -0.008  
(-2.10)** (-1.05) (-0.10) (0.31) (2.64)*** (-0.08) (0.40) (0.34) (-0.30) 
This table reports quarterly regression results. Panel A reports the determinant of institutional demand (ΔSIO and Adj_ΔIO) as a dependent variable in quarters following low 
and high distress premiums.  The distress premium (the average monthly return differences between the bottom and top decile portfolios in each quarter) is separated into 
low and high groups by a 50% cut-off rate.  Panel B reports determinants of institutional demand in quarters with the low and high premiums. Each controlling variable is 
standardized by subtracting the cross-sectional mean value and dividing by the cross-sectional standard deviation. PD is the predicted probability of ST in quarter q. Size is 
the natural log of the market capitalization for a firm’s tradable shares at the end of quarter q. BTM is the book value of equity in the last financial year divided by total 
market capitalization at the end of quarter q; Turnover is the average daily turnover during the past 12 months， ending in quarter q. Price is the closing price at the end of 
quarter q. Illiquidity is the ratio of absolute values of monthly returns divided by the total number of shares traded averaged over the past 12 months, ending in quarter q.  
Momentum is the averaged past 12-month returns, ending in quarter q. Volatility is the averaged daily return standard deviation in the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. 
Skewness is the averaged daily return skewness in the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. t-statistics associated with each coefficient are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 11 Determinants of institutional ownership at the beginning and end of year 
 PD BTM Size Turnover Illiquidity Price Momentum Skewness Volatility 
Q2, t  -0.030 -0.041 0.248 -0.112 -0.011 0.394 0.035 -0.006 -0.012 
 (-2.26)** (-1.27) (5.77)*** (-2.57)** (-0.70) (12.77)*** (-1.79)* (-0.44) (-0.51) 
Q1, t+1  -0.018 -0.020 0.225 -0.112 0.002 0.366 0.012 -0.003 0.027 
 (-1.30) (-0.65) (4.92)*** (-2.98)*** (-0.13) (10.36)*** (-0.47) (-0.26) (-1.20) 
Diff -0.011 0.024 -0.022 0.000 -0.014 0.027 0.023 -0.003 -0.039 
 (-0.59) (0.38) (-0.49) (0.00) (-0.59) (0.58) (0.70) (-0.15) (-1.20) 
          
Q2&3,t 
-0.032 -0.045 0.234 -0.103 0.003 0.380 0.039 0.007 -0.031 
(-3.37)*** (-2.01) (7.58)*** (-3.68)*** (-0.20) (17.62)*** (3.68)*** (-0.61) (-2.12)** 
Q4, t  & Q1, t+1 
-0.021 -0.043 0.239 -0.102 0.000 0.405 0.028 -0.011 0.010 
(-2.25)** (-1.95) (7.71)*** (-4.26)*** (-0.01) (17.13)*** (1.71)* (-1.17) (-0.74) 
Diff -0.011 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.024 0.011 0.017 -0.041 
 (-0.81) (-0.07) (-0.10) (-0.04) (0.15) (-0.76) (0.59) (1.21) (-2.04)** 
This table reports quarterly regression results. It reports determinants of IO at the beginning and end of each information period and test their difference. Each controlling 
variable is standardized by subtracting the cross-sectional mean value and dividing by the cross-sectional standard deviation. PD is the predicted probability of ST in quarter 
q. Size is the natural log of the market capitalization for a firm’s tradable shares at the end of quarter q. BTM is the book value of equity in the last financial year divided by 
total market capitalization at the end of quarter q; Turnover is the average daily turnover during the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. Price is the closing price at the end of 
quarter q. Illiquidity is the ratio of absolute values of monthly returns divided by the total number of shares traded averaged over the past 12 months, ending in quarter q.  
Momentum is the averaged past 12-month returns, ending in quarter q. Volatility is the averaged daily return standard deviation in the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. 
Skewness is the averaged daily return skewness in the past 12 months, ending in quarter q. t-statistics associated with each coefficient are reported in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
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Appendix A1: ST events in the sample period 
 
ST reasons  Number of ST cases 
Continuous loss in past two years and book value equity below par 467 
Failure to disclose annual report on time  6 
Negative audit opinions for latest financial reports 36 
Under lawsuits for bank loan default 10 
Failure in financial investments and loan guarantee 5 
Suspended operations that were caused by other reasons 6 
Bankruptcy filings 6 
Extraordinary losses in the prior year and inadequate liquidity  9 
Total 545 
 
Note: The table reports the number of ST events for different type of reasons. The sample period is 
from January 1998 to December 2012.  
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Appendix A2: Variable description 
Size: total market capitalizations of tradable shares in the last month.  
Turnover: the average ratio of the number of shares traded, divided by the number of tradable 
shares outstanding in the past 12 months. 
Book-to-market ratio (BTM): book equity value at the end of the last financial year over 
market value equity in the last month.  
Illiquidity: the average ratio of an absolute value of monthly returns divided by the total 
number of shares traded in the past 12 months (Amihud, 2002).  
Volatility: the daily return standard deviation in the past 12 months. 
Momentum: the cumulative monthly returns in the past 12 months.  
Skewness: the daily return skewness in the past 12 months. 
lagReturn: the previous month’s returns. 
Price: the closing price at the end of month. 
Institutional ownership (IO): a firm’s tradable A-shares owned by aggregated institutional 
investors to the firm’s total outstanding tradable A-shares 
 
 
 
